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the client persists in refusing to cooperate, then defense counsel still has
a duty to find a way to defend. The dissenting opinion in Dodd stated
it well: "[S]ociety has a significant interest in the nonarbitrary applica-
tion of the death penalty."47 So does the legal profession.
47 Dodd, 838 P.2d at 101 (Utter, J., dissenting).
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I. INTRODUCTION
No person has been executed under a federal statute in the United
States since 1963, when authorities hanged Victor Feguer, a convicted
kidnapper, in Iowa. That is likely to change soon. Responding to ever
increasing public anxiety about drug related violence in the United
States, Congress, in one of its last acts before the 1988 elections,
amended section 848 of Title 21 of the United States Code. 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(e) exposes to the death penalty people involved in a "continuing
criminal enterprise"t who either commit murders or cause them to be
committed.2 The law also provides a possible sanction of death in cases
involving the drug-related homicide of a law enforcement officer. This
amendment is commonly referred to as the Federal Drug Kingpin statute,
though as shall be discussed infra, the reach of the statute extends beyond
drug kingpins.
When the 1988 amendments to section 848 were passed there were
a number of nominally capital federal crimes on the books.3 However,
the death sanction has not been imposed under these statutes since the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia,4 because
in light of Furman, the Justice Department has considered these statutes
1 A person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise or"CCE"
if: (1) she violates any provision of [Title 21, Chapter 13, "Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control," subchapter I (control and enforcement) or
subchapter II (import and export) of the United States Code], and (2) the
violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of [the above
statutory provisions] which are undertaken by such person in concert
with five or more other persons with respect to whom such person
occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other
position of management, and from which such person obtains substantial
income or resources. 21 U.S.C. §848(c).
2 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)-(r)(1988). These sections will be referred to
hereinafter as "the Drug Kingpin Statute."
3 The general federal death penalty statute for murder is 18 U.S.C.
§ 1111 (b). Other statutes carrying a death penalty include: 18 U.S.C.
§ 34 (aircraft or motor vehicle destruction); 18 U.S.C. § 351 (assassina-
tion of high ranking government personnel); 18 U.S.C. § 794 (espio-
nage); 18 U.S.C. § 844 (using explosives that result in death); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1751 (assassination of President and the staff); 18 U.S.C. § 1992 (train
wrecking); 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (treason).
4 408 U.S. 238 (1972)(rnling that capital sentencing procedures
which create a substantial risk that punishment could be inflicted in an
arbitrary and capricious manner violate the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
5 In addition, many of the dormant federal death penalty crimes will
not be enforced because they violate Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977)(holding that the death penalty is disproportionate in a case where
a woman was raped but not killed). Coker has been interpreted as barring
the death penalty in cases where a murder was not committed.
A recent revision of the United States' Attorneys Manual suggests
unconstitutional, and therefore unenforceable, in their current form. 5
This act has been called a revival of the federal death penalty because,
while the death penalty provisions under 21 U.S.C. § 848 should not be
considered a prototype for a constitutionally unassailable death penalty
law, that statute does not carry many of the constitutional infirmities
which previous federal capital provisions contained, and therefore U.S.
Attorneys can pursue prosecutions under it.
6
Even given the few serious doubts about its constitutionality, the
Attorney General has approved death requests under section 848(e)
approximately twenty times, and has received only four death verdicts.
7
To put these statistics in context, it should be noted that there are more
than 1300 drug related homicides in the United States each year.8 There
are a number of explanations for why the statute has not been more
widely employed, but before delving into those reasons, the statute
should be analyzed.
II. A FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY FOR
"DRUG KINGPINS" (AND OTHERS)
The death penalty provision of section 848 reads as follows:
that the death penalty could be imposed under some of these statutes
(which do not otherwise violate Coker). The manual suggests that
prosecutors may be able to rehabilitate the death eligible offenses by
characterizing them as crimes against the United States. Such a charac-
terization would limit the death penalty to a small segment of federal
cases, and therefore would pass constitutional muster under Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). See Sandra D. Jordon, Death For Drug
Related Killings: Revival of the Federal Death Penalty, 67 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 79, 86 n. 31 (1991).
6 For example, the Drug Kingpin statute of 1988 provides specific
statutory aggravating and mitigating factors as well as numerous other
procedural protections, unlike the general federal homicide statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1111, which gives the jury no guidance whatsoever: "[w]hoever
is guilty of murder in the first degree, shall suffer death unless the jury
qualifies its verdict by adding thereto 'without capital punishment', in
which event he shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life .... ." 18
U.S.C. § 1111 (b).
7 Three Richmond crack dealers were sentenced to death in Febru-
ary 1993 for a number of drug related killings. In 1991, David R.
Chandler, an Alabama marijuana dealer was sentenced to death.
Chandler's appeal is pending before the 11th Circuit. See Robert F.
Howe, U.S. Jury Orders Death For3 Va. Drug Dealers, Wash. Post, Feb.
17, 1993, at Al.
8 See, Edward Frost, Arbitrary Prosecution?: Alleged Drug King-
pin Challenges Constitutionality of Federal Death Penalty Law, ABA
Journal, Jan. 1992, at 30. Note also that although more than 200
executions have taken place since the death penalty was reinstated in
1976, there have only been thirty-four federal executions in our entire
history. See Betty Parham & Gerrie Ferris, Atlanta J.-Const., Mar. 15,
1993, at A2.
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(A) any person engaging in or working in furtherance of a
continuing criminal enterprise, or any person engaging in
an offense punishable under section 841 (b)(1)(A) or section
960(b)(1) 9 who intentionally kills or counsels, commands,
induces, procures, or causes the intentional killing of an
individual and such killing results, shall be sentenced to any
term of imprisonment, or may be sentenced to death; and
(B) any person, during the commission of, in furtherance of,
or while attempting to avoid prosecution or service of a
prison sentence for, a felony of this subchapter or subchapter
II of this chapter who intentionally kills or counsels, com-
mands, induces, procures, or causes the intentional killing
of any Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer
engaged in, or on account of, the performance of such
officer's official duties and such killing results, shall be
sentenced to any term of imprisonment, which shall not be
less than 20 years, and which may be up to life imprison-
ment, or may be sentenced to death.
21 U.S.C. § 848(e).
The most striking feature of the statute on first glance is its
breadth. Congress clearly wanted to cast a wide net over all aspects of
a drug conspiracy when it drafted this law. While subsection (A)
applies the possible death sanction to all those "engaged" in drug
conspiracies, it also applies to anyone "working in furtherance of a
continuing criminal enterprise." On one extreme, the law would cover
the drug kingpin who kills his opponent by shooting him in the back,
while on the other extreme, it would also cover a murder by a drug
addict pusher who may have only the vaguest notion that he is part of
a large drug distribution operation. Acknowledging the reality of
contemporary illegal drug organizations, the law does not require the
drug kingpin to actually commit the murder (act as the "triggerman")
in order to be liable for the death. Counselling, commanding, procur-
ing, or causing a death to occur will suffice.
Subsection (B) also employs sweeping language, and is aimed at
protecting law enforcement officers10 engaged in drug enforcement
while on duty performing their official duties. 11 Once again, the wide
scope of the statutory language could include everyone from a high
9 These sections cover federal felony drug offenses.
10 "Law enforcement officer" is defined by the statute as "a public
servant authorized by law or by a Government agency or Congress to
conduct or engage in the prevention, investigation, prosecution or
adjudication of an offense, and includes those engaged in corrections,
probation, or parole functions." 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(2).
11 Interestingly, an informal survey by the House Select Commit-
tee on Narcotics found that during an eighteen month period in 1987-88,
no police officer had been killed in drug raids or by a drug dealer. 134
Cong. Rec. S7567 (daily ed. Jun. 10, 1988). See Tombolowsky, Drugs
and Death: Congress Authorizes the Death Penalty for Certain Drug-
Related Murders, 18 J. Contemp. L. 47, 71 (1992) [hereinafter
Tombolowsky, Drugs and Death].
12 21 U.S.C. § 848(g).
13 21 U.S.C. § 848(h)(1)(A).
level drug conspirator dealer who shoots an officer during a raid, to
any convicted street dealer who intentionally kills a prison official, for
example, in an attempt to escape. As in the previous section, this
subsection also makes drug kingpins liable for a killing of a law
enforcement officer when they directed or caused the killing to occur.
Section 848 provides federal capital defendants with a number of
procedural rights. First of all, the defendant is entitled to a pretrial
hearing on the propriety of the death penalty in her case. 12 Capital
defendants are entitled to notice at a reasonable time before trial (or the
acceptance of a guilty plea) that the Government will seek the death
penalty. 13 Such notice must include the aggravating factors (statutory
or other) upon which the Government intends to rely to support
death. 14 Perhaps the most important right given under this law to
(indigent) capital defendants is the right to appointed counsel from the
pretrial stages of the case all the way through the very last habeas
appeal to the United States Supreme Court.15 The statute imposes
standards for capital representation, and these standards will be dis-
cussed infra. The statute also provides for the appointment of neces-
sary investigators and experts as defendant shall require.
As with all valid capital statutes, section 848 provides for a
separate sentencing hearing. The defendant may be sentenced before
a jury, or on her motion and with concurrence of the Government,
before the court. Both options are available whether the defendant was
tried during the guilt phase before the court sitting alone or by ajury. 16
The procedure by which the jury considers evidence of aggravation or
mitigation at the sentencing stage will be discussed in greater detail
when compared infra to the Virginia scheme, but an outline of the
procedure is appropriate at this point.
At the sentencing stage, the Government opens the proceeding by
offering evidence of aggravation, defense counsel then offers mitigat-
ing evidence in reply, and finally the Government is permitted to reply
in rebuttal. Any mitigating evidence, including the non-exclusive list
of statutory mitigators, may be offered at sentencing. The Govern-
ment is limited to the statutory aggravators, unless it has given the
defendant notice before trial that it intends to rely on non-statutory
aggravators. 17 The rules of evidence do not apply to evidence offered
at the sentencing phase unless there is "danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury."
1 8
In order for the Government to obtain a conviction, the jury must
find at least one of the statutory aggravating factors found in section
14 21 U.S.C. § 848(h)(1)(B).
15 21 U.S.C. §§ (q)(4)(A), (B)(8). Cf. Giarratano v. Murray, 847
F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1988)(holding that Virginia's post conviction ser-
vices to death row inmates were inadequate, finding that inmates were
denied"meaningful access to the courts"). See Va. Code Ann. §19.2-325
(1990)(providing for the payment of appeals for indigent defendants).
16 21 U.S.C. § 848(i).
17 See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 891-92 (1983)(noting that
"the Constitution does not require a State to adopt specific standards for
instructing the jury in its consideration of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances," and therefore non-statutory aggravators are constitu-
tional).
18 21 U.S.C. § 848(j).
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848(n)(1), 19 and at least one other aggravating factor.20 If no section
(n)(1) aggravators are found or only one section (n)(1) aggravatorbutno
additional aggravators are found, then a sentence less than death shall be
imposed. Aggravating factors must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt by the Government and found by a unanimous jury, while mitigators
must be proven by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence and
there is no unanimity requirement. 21 Should the jury find the requisite
aggravating factors, then it shall conduct a balancing of aggravating and
mitigating factors to see if death is the appropriate sanction.
That this statute was the product of political compromise is evident
in several of the limitations on the imposition of a death sentence. First
of all, although the United States Supreme Court in Penry v. Lynaugh
22
declined to state categorically that a mentally retarded defendant may not
be executed, this statute imposes such a limitation in section 848(/).
Similarly, the Court has not prohibited the death penalty for defendants
under age eighteen, 23 but section 848() prohibits such executions.
One of the central concerns of death penalty opponents since the
1960's has been the role racial prejudice plays in cases in which
defendants receive death sentences. The drafters of the Drug Kingpin
Statute addressed this concern in section 848(o). That section requires
that the jury be instructed that it is not to impose a death sentence "unless
it has concluded that it would recommend a sentence of death for the
crime in question no matter what the race, color, religious beliefs,
national origin, or sex of the defendant or the victim, may be." 24 The
statute also instructed the General Accounting Office to study what role
race has played in the imposition of death sentences since 1976.
19 Section (n)(1) lists the following aggravators considered to be
of primary importance by the drafters:
(1) The defendant -
(A) intentionally killed the victim
(B) intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury which resulted
in the death of the victim;
(C) intentionally engaged in conduct intending that the victim
be killed or that lethal force be employed against the victim,
which resulted in the death of the victim;
(D) intentionally engaged in conduct which -
(i) the defendant knew would create a grave risk of death to a
person other than one of the participants in the offense; and
(ii) resulted in the death of the victim.
This section clearly stresses the intentional nature of the conduct.
Because a conviction requires the jury to find an intentional killing,
inclusion of the intent element in the aggravating factors may produce
impermissible duplication and overlap. See, Tombolowsky, Drugs and
Death, supra note 11, at 62.
20 The other aggravating factors may be derived from the eleven
additional statutory aggravators listed in subsection (n):
[n](2) The defendant has been convicted of another Federal
offense, or a State offense resulting in the death of a person,
for which a sentence of life imprisonment or a sentence of
death was authorized by statute;
(3) The defendant has previously been convicted of two or
more state or federal offenses punishable by a term of impris-
onment of more than one year, committed on different occa-
sions, involving the infliction of, or attempted infliction of,
serious bodily injury upon another person;
(4) The defendant had previously been convicted of two or
more State or Federal offenses punishable by a term of
imprisonment of more than one year, committed on different
occasions, involving the distribution of a controlled sub-
stance;
(5) In the commission of the offense or in escaping apprehen-
sion for a violation [qualifying as a death offense under 21
IH. FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY VS. VIRGINIA'S
CAPITAL SCHEME: THE SAME GAME
WITH DIFFERENT RULES
One of the best ways for Virginia practitioners to become familiar
with the federal drug kingpin death penalty statute is through a
comparison to the Virginia statute. While the federal statute remains
in its infancy, the federal bench will likely rely on state practitioners
with capital experience to defend federal defendants. A number of
important differences exist between the two schemes of which defense
counsel in Virginia should be aware.
A. Rules of Evidence - Penalty Trial
Federal procedure and Virginia procedure vary somewhat on the
rules for admissibility of evidence in aggravation and mitigation. The
Virginia statutory scheme allows evidence in at the sentencing stage
"subject to the rules of evidence governing admissibility. '25 The
federal scheme does not have such a requirement:
[a]ny other information relevant to such aggravating or
mitigating factors may be presented by either the Govern-
ment or the defendant regardless of its admissibility un-
der the rules governing admission of evidence at crimi-
U.S.C. § 848], the defendant knowingly created a grave risk
of death to one or more persons in addition to the victims of the
offense;
(6) The defendant procured the commission of the offense by
payment, or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary
value;
(7) The defendant committed the offense as consideration for
the receipt, or the expectation of the receipt, of anything of
pecuniary value;
(8) The defendant committed the offense after substantial
planning and premeditation;
(9) The victim was particularly vulnerable due to old age,
youth, or infirmity;
(10) The defendant had previously been convicted of [a
federal felony drug offense] for which a sentence of five or
more years may be imposed or had previously been convicted
of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise;
(11) The violation of [21 U.S.C. § 848] in relation to which
subsection (e) of this section occurred was a violation [involv-
ing sales of narcotics to purchasers under age eighteen];
(12) The defendant committed the offense in an especially
heinous, cruel, or depraved manner in that it involved torture
or serious physical abuse to the victim.
In addition to the statutory aggravators, the Government may
introduce any other aggravating factor as long as defense counsel
receives sufficient notice under 21 U.S.C. § 848(h)(1)(B). See Zant 1'.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,891-92 (1983)(sanctioning non-statutory aggra-
vating factors) andLankford v.Idaho, 111 S. Ct 1723 (1991)(holding that
Due Process requires that defendant be given notice so that it may
properly defend against a death penalty prosecution.)
21 See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 370 (1990) (striking
down North Carolina statute requiring that ajury find a mitigating factor
unanimously before it may be considered). See also Mills v. Matyland,
486 U.S. 367 (1987).
22 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
23 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 494 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding that the
Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the imposition of the death penalty
on a person who was sixteen or seventeen years old at the time of the
crime).
24 21 U.S.C. § 848(o)(1).
25 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(B) (1990).
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nal trials, except that information may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury.
26
Some commentators fear that the suspension of the rules of evi-
dence may lead to a violation of a defendant's constitutional rights.27 For
example, introduction of hearsay or illegally seized evidence may violate
a defendant's Sixth and Fourth Amendment rights, respectively. 28 On
one hand, this federal policy seems to violate the "heightened reliability"
standard of Voodson v. North Carolina29 by introducing a lesser
standard of admissibility into a proceeding which requires the most
stringent safeguards for the defendant. On the other hand, there will be
cases where the defendant will benefit from the less stringent federal
rules.30 For example, in Stewart v. Commonwealth,31 had the Supreme
Court of Virginia been less stringent in its application of the rules of
evidence and the rules of criminal procedure, defendant may have been
able to more effectively rebut the Commonwealth's expert testimony.
32
B. Burden of Proof - Penalty Trial
Another difference between the two statutes involves the allocation
of the burden of proof. Both the Federal Drug Kingpin statute and the
Virginia capital scheme require that all aggravating factors be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the federal scheme requires that
the defendant prove mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.33 Placing such a burden on the defendant seems to contravene the
general rule under Mills v. Maryland
34 and McKoy v. North Carolina35
that no procedural limitations should be placed on consideration of
defendant's mitigating evidence. However, the United States Supreme
Court approved the shifting of the burden of proving mitigation factors
to the defendant at the sentencing stage in Walton v. Arizona.36 The
Arizona law sanctioned by the Walton majority required that the defen-
dant prove mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence, and
therefore this provision is constitutional under current law.
By contrast, the Virginia statutory scheme offers no guidance
whatsoever for juries to assist them in determining whether mitigating
evidence has been properly established. The statute does not mention a
burden of proof for mitigation, and therefore it does not mention which
side carries the burden. In addition, the standard instructions and the
verdict form which stress aggravating evidence, do not give mitigation
evidence its proper weight.
It is difficult to determine which scheme is more advantageous for
capital defendants. Given no guidance, a Virginia jury may consider
evidence offered but not strongly supported. On the other hand, the
federal statutory requirement makes defense counsel's burden clear, and
26 21 U.S.C. § 848(j) (emphasis added).
27 See Tombolowsky, Drugs and Death, supra note 11, at 58.
28 Id.
29 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (finding a heightened reliability
requirement in capital sentencing determinations is constitutionally
required).
30 See, e.g., Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979)(holding that
defendant must be able to introduce evidence at sentencing phase despite
the fact that it violated Georgia's hearsay rule).
31 245 Va. 222,427 S.E.2d 394 (1993).
32 See case summary of Stewart, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
33 21 U.S.C. § 8480).
34 486 U.S. 302 (1989).
35 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
36 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990). See case summary of Valton, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 5 (1990).
37 See Jim Mason, Poll Gives Virginians' Views onAbolishing the
Death Penalty, Rich. News Leader, June 29, 1989, at 22.
Note, however, that life without parole is possible in Virginia.
T lndr Viroanis, A(InP reetin 53 1-151 (B 1. a "three time loser." i.e..a
offers him the opportunity to introduce a favorable jury instruction on
mitigation, an opportunity not always afforded in Virginia.
C. Life Without Parole
Unlike Virginia, the Federal Drug Kingpin statute gives federal
judges the option of imposing life without parole. The existence of this
option may have a significant impact on the rate of executions. A 1989
poll conducted by the Survey Research Laboratory at Virginia Common-
wealth University indicated that fifty-nine percent of Virginians favor
the abolition of the death penalty if the Commonwealth had a life without
parole option and some system of restitution for the victim's family.
37
D. Mitigation Evidence
Both statutory schemes include a non-exclusive list of mitigating
factors. Statutory mitigators common to section 848 and Virginia Code
section 19.2-264.4 include: the defendant's having acted under extreme
mental or emotional stress,38 an inability of the defendant to understand
the criminality of his actions or conform his behavior to the requirements
of the law, 39 the defendant's lack of a significant prior criminal record,40
and the fact that the victim consented to the criminal activity which led
to his death.
41
Virginia includes mitigating evidence of the age and the mental
retardation of the defendant in its procedure. The federal scheme also
takes age into consideration, 42 but excludes all defendants under age
eighteen. 43 The federal scheme does not include mental retardation
among its mitigating factors because 21 U.S.C. § 848(l) prohibits the
execution of mentally retarded defendants. In an additional exclusion
under §848(), a mentally ill defendant who:
(1) cannot understand the nature of the pending proceedings,
what [he] was tried for, the reason for the punishment, or the
nature of the punishment; or (2) lacks the capacity to recog-
nize or understand acts which would make the punishment
unjust or unlawful or lacks the ability to convey such informa-
tion to counsel or to the court...
cannot be executed."
Section 848(m) contains several mitigating factors not listed by
Virginia. They include evidence: that the defendant was under substan-
tial or unusual duress, that the defendant is punishable as principal
participant but actually only played a minor role in the crime, that the
defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that his actions would have
led to the death of another,45 and that another defendant, equally culpable,
defendant who has been convicted of three separate felony offenses
(murder, rape, or robbery while brandishing a firearm) shall not be
eligible for parole. Virginia courts have consistently resisted efforts to
get this information beforejuries at the sentencing phase of capital trials.
38 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(7); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(B)(ii).
39 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(1); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(B)(iv).
40 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(6); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(B)(i).
41 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(9); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(B)(iii).
42 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(5).
43 21 U.S.C. § 848(l).
44 See Ford v. Wainright,477 U.S. 399,405-10 (1986)(holding that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of the insane, and
therefore defendants have a right to a hearing on competency to be
executed).
45 It is arguable that this factor is meaningless in the context of this
statutory scheme, because in order for a defendant to be death eligible,
a subsection (n)(1) aggravator must be found. Because each of the (n)(1)
factors require that the offense be intentional, it is difficult to fathom a
situation where intent can be established, but the defendant could not
have foreseen the consequences of his actions.
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will not receive the death penalty.46 These factors have been specially
crafted for use in the context of drug conspiracies. While particularized
factors like these would be difficult to incorporate into a general death
penalty statute, the drafters saw fit to include them here, perhaps as a trade-
off for the statute's unusually broad scope. The more defendants charge-
able under the statute, the greater the number of mitigation theories.
E. Aggravating Evidence
As discussed briefly above, the Federal Drug Kingpin statute
includes an elaborate structure for considering aggravating evidence. In
the two-tiered procedure, the jury must first find a primary aggravator.
These are listed in section 848(n)(1) as follows:
(1) The defendant -
(A) intentionally killed the victim;
(B) intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury which resulted
in the death of the victim;
(C) intentionally engaged in conduct intending that the victim
be killed or that lethal force be employed against the victim,
which resulted in the death of the victim;
(D) intentionally engaged in conduct which -
(i) the defendant knew would create a grave risk of death to a
person other than one of the participants in the offense; and
(ii) resulted in the death of the victim.
If the jury fails to find a primary aggravator, then the defendant will
receive a life sentence and the jury need not consider the eleven
additional aggravators set out in subsection (n)(2)-(12).47
As with statutory mitigating factors, the federal statute includes a
number of particularized aggravating factors specially formulated for
murders within the context of a drug conspiracy. I-i addition to the
aggravators discussed above, section 848(n) includes the following
aggravators: the defendant had been convicted of two or more felony
drug offenses; the defendant paid someone to commit the murder or at
least promised to pay; the defendant had been paid to commit the murder
or at least had received a promise of payment; the defendant committed
the offense after substantial planning and premeditation; the victim was
particularly vulnerable due to old age or infirmity; the defendant had
previously been convicted of a drug offense which resulted in a sentence
of five years or more or had previously been convicted of involvement
in a "CCE"; and that the drug offense which led to the murder under
section 848 involved attempted sales of controlled substances to victims
under the age of eighteen.
The Virginia statute, by contrast, is much more administratively
simple, and is composed of two alternative bases for aggravation: "future
dangerousness" and "vileness." These are the only factors upon which
the Commonwealth may rely. According to the Virginia Code, future
46 The Virginia Supreme Court considers this factor to be irrel-
evant. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
47 In addition, the prosecution may rely on a non-statutory theory
of aggravation if the defendant is given notice for good cause shown. 21
U.S.C. § 848 (h). See supra note 20.
48 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C) (1990).
49 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(b)(1988).
50 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(7).
51 See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (n)(2), (3).
52 Va. Code § 19.2-264.4(C) (1990). It is the position of the
Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse that Virginia's vileness factor is
unconstitutional under Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (strik-
ing down Georgia death penalty statute with identical "vileness" factor
as unconstitutionally vague because it failed to guide jury's discretion).
Such a vileness standard may be constitutional if the state's courts define
all the vague terms used, and the trial courts are required to issue
narrowing instructions. The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, has
dangerousness is established if the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt
that "there is a probability based upon evidence of the prior history of the
defendant or of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
offense of which he is accused that he would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society.
'48
The federal scheme takes a different approach to the issue of future
dangerousness. The scheme as a whole takes future dangerousness into
consideration without explicitly including it in the enumerated statutory
factors. It can be argued, for example, that the primary aggravating
factors of subsection (n)(1), discussed above, by their very nature,
indicate future dangerousness. Under a general capital statute the
aggravating factors of subsection (n)(1), which basically emphasize the
intentional nature of the offense, would not be enough to indicate future
dangerousness. However, assuming the Federal Drug Kingpin statute
will notbe applied too broadly, a conviction under2l U.S.C. §848(e) will
almost always indicate future dangerousness because of the particular
type of criminal behavior proscribed by this statute. For example, in
Virginia, a murder for hire is a predicate offense under the capital murder
statute.49 That a defendant was paid to commit murder is an aggravating
factor under the federal scheme.50 It is at least arguable that a defendant
who commits a murder for hire within the context of a major drug
conspiracy is much more likely always to pose a future danger than a
defendant charged in an isolated incident under a general statute.
Furthermore, several of the additional aggravating factors listed in
§848 include consideration of repeated past incidents of violent crime by
the defendant,51 which may indicate future dangerousness. Subsection
(n)(5) considers the fact that the defendant, in an attempt to escape, put
people (other than the victims of his crime) in grave risk of death, as an
aggravator. Such disregard for human life may indicate future dangerous-
ness as well. Future dangerousness, while certainly central to a number of
the federal statutory aggravators, is not an express factor under section 848.
The other basis for aggravation in Virginia is the "vileness" of the
murder: the defendant's "conduct in committing the offense was outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim."'52 The federal
scheme contains an almost identical provision: "[t]he defendant commit-
ted the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved mannerin that
it involved torture or serious physical abuse to the victim."'53 The federal
bench may need to issue narrowing constructions for the federal "vileness"
factor to avoid constitutionalvoid-for-vagueness claims which similarly
worded statutes have faced.54 However, because the federal statute
limits the "heinousness" aggravating factor to cases of torture or serious
physical abuse, an additional narrowing construction may not be neces-
sary.
F. Appellate Review
The appellate review procedures under the two statutes also differ
slightly. Under the federal statute, the appellate court shall examine "the
not required that a narrowing construction be issued. See Clark v.
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201,257 S.E.2d 784 (1979). When the Virginia
courts do issue narrowing instructions, they are usually highly question-
able. For example, the Virginia Supreme Court has defined "depravity
of mind" as "a degree of moral turpitude and psychical debasement
surpassing that inherent in definition of legal malice and premeditation."
Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 478, 248 S.E.2d 135, 148-149
(1978). For a further discussion on the "vileness" factor, see Lago,
Litigating the "Vileness" Factor in Virginia, Capital Defense Digest,
Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 24 (1991). See also Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534
(1993) and case summary of Arave, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
53 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(12). The United States Supreme Court in
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356,363-64 (1988), equated statutory
schemes which use "heinous, atrocious and cruel" language with stat-
utes, such as Virginia, which refer to "vileness."
54 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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record, the evidence submitted during the trial, the information submit-
ted during the sentencing hearing, the procedures employed in the
sentencing hearing," as well as any special findings. 55 Perhaps most
importantly the appellate court will examine the trial court's findings on
aggravation and mitigation. Under section 848(q)(3)(B) the court must
affirm the sentence if it finds the existence of every aggravating factor
upon which the sentencer relied as well as no mitigating factors. 56 An
additional consideration, which may or may not ultimately influence the
quality of the review received by capital defendants, is that federal
defendants obviously do not have to exhaust state remedies, so the
appellate review process in federal capital cases, if nothing else, should
be more expeditious.
57
In addition to considering any issues preserved for appeal, the
appellate courts under both schemes must consider whether the sentence
was "imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other
arbitrary factor."58 In contrast to the federal statute, under Virginia Code
section 17-110.1, the capital defendant receives automatic review by the
Supreme Court of Virginia. It should be noted, therefore, that there is a
danger of defaulting a capital appeal under the federal scheme. The
Virginia scheme also provides that the reviewing court consider whether
"the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defen-
dant." 59
The federal statute's lack of automatic review and proportionality
analysis may have an impact on defendants. However, if defense counsel
are diligent, preserving all issues for appeal and promptly filing for
appeal, the lack of automatic review under the federal statute should not
be an important factor. Similarly, proportionality analysis, if Virginia is
typical, may be somewhat meaningless, because courts can always find
a less culpable defendant who has received a death sentence.
60
The development of the law of proportionality also has had an
impact on the relative importance of proportionality analysis within a
capital sentencing scheme. Many observers believed that after the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Gregg v. Georgia,6 1 which
stressed the value of proportionality analysis, that such analysis was an
integral part of an acceptable capital sentencing statute. As a result, many
states, like Virginia, included proportionality review in their statutes.
Subsequently, the Court held in Pulley v. Harris,62 that proportionality
analysis is not required under the Eighth Amendment. Since Pulley,
courts have not given significant weight to disproportionality claims.
While on the subject of proportionality, it should be noted that the
federal statute does take into consideration explicitly, as a mitigating
factor, evidence that a co-defendant will not receive the death penalty. In
Virginia too, such evidence will most likely be admitted as mitigating
evidence. However, it will not be considered as part of a proportionality
review. The Virginia Supreme Court held in Coppola v. Common-
wealth63 that imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment upon a co-
55 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(2).
56 See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990) (upholding
statute which requires mandatory imposition of the death penalty if ajury
unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigat-
ing circumstances, as long as jury is able to consider and give effect to
all mitigating evidence).
57 The fact that federal defendants cannot pursue appeals in the
state systems also means that their constitutional claims will not be
defaulted and sacrificed to considerations of federalism and comity. See,
e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991), and case summary
of Coleman, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 4 (1991); Jones v.
Murray, 976 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1992), and case summary of Jones,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 16 (1993); Smith v. Dixon, 996
F.2d 667 (1993) and case summary of Smith, Capital Defense Digest, this
issue.
58 Va. Code Ann. § 17-1 10.1(C)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 848 (q)(3)(A).
59 Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.1(C)(2).
60 The Supreme Court of Virginia to date has never set aside a death
cpntpnrp. inndpr Vircyinin ('ndip qpotinn 17/-1 10f
defendant did not require commutation of the death sentence imposed
upon the defendant who was convicted of the same capital murder.
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G. Standards for Capital Counsel
The federal statute does include an explicit set of guidelines for
choosing defense attorneys for indigent defendants in federal capital
cases under21 U.S.C. § 848. The statute provides for appointed counsel
from pretrial all the way through the defendant's last appeal to the United
States Supreme Court. In addition, the statute provides counsel for
defendants who become indigent after judgment but before the final
execution of judgment.
65
At least one member of the appointed defense team at the trial level
must have "been admitted to practice in the court in which the prosecu-
tion is to be tried for not less than five years, and must have had not less
than three years experience in the actual trial of felony prosecutions in
that court."'66 At the appellate level, one of the defense attorneys must
have similar qualifications before the circuit court.
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Virginia's standards for appointed capital counsel are quite similar.
Under Virginia Code section 19.2-163.8(E) the Virginia Public De-
fender Commission promulgates the standards which have recently been
revised. Just as the federal procedure attempts to insure that at least one
attorney on the defense team has the requisite extraordinary skills needed
to defend a capital case, Virginia has different requirements for "lead
counsel" and "co-counsel." "Lead" counsel in capital cases in Virginia
must be a member of the Virginia bar (unless specially admitted for a
particular case), must have five years of demonstrated competence in
criminal litigation, and must have had specialized training in capital
litigation within two years of being appointed. In addition, lead counsel
must have either acted as lead counsel in a capital case previously, acted
as co-counsel in at least two capital cases, or have had experience as lead
counsel in five or more felony jury trials in Virginia involving violence
and carrying a possible sentence of five years or more. Appointed
appellate counsel must have argued at least three cases in an appellate
court or have previously argued a death penalty appeal. The Virginia
rules also include special requirements for counsel on habeas.
H. Attorneys' Fees
Although the resulting fee may be identical, the calculation of fees
for appointed counsel under the two systems differs. In Virginia, defense
counsel assigned to a felony case in which the defendant may face at least
a twenty year term of punishment can receive compensation of no more
than $575.68 However, the Commonwealth has removed the fee ceiling
in capital cases so defense counsel in Virginia will receive "an amount
deemed reasonable by the court.
' 69
According to the Criminal Justice Act of 1986,70 appointed counsel
in most federal cases shall not receive more than $60 per hour for her time
61 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
62 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
63 220 Va. 243, 257 S.E.2d 797 (1979).
64 See also Murphy v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136,431 S.E.2d
(1993), and case summary of Murphy, Capital Defense Digest, this issue;
Thomas v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 1, 26, 419 S.E.2d 606, 620, cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 421 (1992); King v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 353,37 1,
416 S.E.2d 669, 679, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 417 (1992); Evans v.
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 766, 780, 284 S.E.2d 816, 823 (1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1038 (1982), aff don remand, 228 Va. 468,323 S.E.2d
114 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1025 (1985).
65 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(A)(ii).
66 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(5).
67 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(6). Note that at both the trial and appellate
levels, the court, within its discretion may waive these requirements. 21
U.S.C. § 848(q)(7).
68 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-163(2)(1990).
69 Id.
70 1P TT Rq f s AnnA (l cm)Ch
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spent in court, or $40 per hour for her time spent out of court.71 At the trial
level, the statute limits the total compensation which any single attorney
working on a felony case may earn at $3,500.72 The fee ceiling at the
appellate level stands at $2,500. 73 However, these statutory fee limits may
be waived in cases involving "extended or complex representation."
74
The trial judge must certify that the payment is necessary to secure fair
representation for the defendant and the chief judge of the circuit must
approve the payment. Every capital case can be correctly characterized as
"extended or complex representation" and therefore, defense counsel in
capital cases will likely receive a substantially equivalent fee whether she
is appointed in state or federal court. In the event that an indigent defendant
in a capital case is better represented in federal court than he would have
been in state court, it is unlikely that compensation will be an explanation
for any disparity in quality of counsel.
75
IV. RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Voir Dire
Practitioners familiar with the Virginia rules of criminal procedure
should be aware of differences in procedure under the federal rules.
Significant differences exist in the area of jury voir dire, for example.
Under the Virginia rules, "counsel, as of right, may examine on oath any
prospective juror and ask any question relevant to his qualifications as an
impartial juror. ' 76 Under the federal rules, however, attorneys do not
have the automatic right to conduct voir dire, though the judge may allow
them to participate within his discretion.77 The federal rules permit each
side twenty peremptory challenges in a death penalty case,78 while under
Virginia Code section 19.2-262, each side may only exercise four pe-
remptory strikes. Although defense counsel may not have the right to
directly question prospective jurors under the federal rules, they are
given a reasonable number of peremptory strikes.
When the federal and the Virginia voir dire procedures are com-
pared, a balance becomes apparent. In the federal system, the detriment
to the defendant caused by the inability of defense counsel to question
prospective jurors directly may be alleviated by the generous number of
peremptory strikes. Under the Virginia system, the reverse is true, and
hence the balance. In the end, however, if the court utilizes a reasonable
portion of voir dire questions submitted by defense counsel, the twenty
peremptory strikes will most likely be more valuable than the ability to
examine the prospective jurors, especially since Virginia judges often
resist individual voir dire, and otherwise limit the examination mandated
by Virginia rule 3A: 14.
79
71 In certain designated districts, an absolute ceiling rate of $75 per
hour may be appropriate. These areas are designated by the Judicial
Conference.
72 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d).
73 Id.
74 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(3).
75 For further information on determination of attorney's fees
under the federal system, see U.S. DistrictCourtRules (W.D. Va.), Local
Rule 29, part V.
76 Virginia rules of criminal procedure, 3A: 14(a).
77 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(a).
78 Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(b).
79 See, e.g., Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (upholding
Virginia trial court's refusal to allow jurors to be examined concerning
the content of pretrial publicity to which they had been exposed).
80 See former Va. Code § 19.2-263, repealed by Acts 1993, cc. 462
and 489.
81 "On motion of the Commonwealth, for good cause shown, the
court, in its discretion, may order persons charged with participating in
contemporaneous and related acts or occurrences or in a series of acts or
B. Joinder
Joinder of defendants is another area that deserves comparison.
Before 1993, the Commonwealth could only try co-defendants jointly if
the defendants consented. 80 Undercurrent law, defendants may be tried
jointly if the Commonwealth can show good cause and ajoint trial would
not cause prejudice to the defendant. 81 The Commonwealth may argue
that the financial benefits of joining defendants may be a sufficient
impetus forjoinder. However, if defense counsel challenges joinder, the
additional hearings needed to consider such a challenge may eliminate
any economic benefits for the Commonwealth. On its face the Virginia
joinder statute is more restrictive than the federal rules, because it places
the burden on the prosecutor to show good cause. Assuming, however,
that the Commonwealth can sustain its showing of good cause, under the
Virginia rules, it will be difficult to avoidjoinder of co-defendants unless
the defendant can show prejudice.
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The federal rules also use a prejudice standard:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced
by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or
information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may
order an election or separate trials or provide whatever other
relief justice requires .
3
However, the overall scheme of the federal rules for joinder seems to be
more permissive. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8, for example,
simply says that joinder is permissible if the defendants "participated in
the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions
constituting an offense or offenses." The language of Rule 13 is similarly
permissive.84 It seems that the language of the federal rules would put
the defendant on equal ground with the Government to argue for and
against joinder. However, federal case law favors joinder, 85 and there-
fore, in practice the joinder of defendants under the federal rules and the
Virginia statute may become substantially similar.
C. Discovery
Discovery practice under Virginia and federal procedure is very
similar, as the Virginia rules are modeled after the federal rules. There
are a number of minor differences. For example, the Virginia rules
explicitly require written discovery motions, while Federal Rule 16 does
not.86 In addition, the Virginia rules require the defendant, after a
successful motion for discovery of the Commonwealth's scientific or
medical evidence, to turn over the results of scientific or medical tests
occurrences constituting an offense or offenses to be tried jointly unless
such joint trial would constitute prejudice to a defendant. If the court
finds that ajoint trial would constitute prejudice to a defendant, the court
shall order severance as to that defendant or provide such other relief
justice requires." Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-262.1 (1993).
82 Another argument Virginia capital defendants facing joinder
should make is that joinder in a complex capital case is inherently
prejudicial, especially when selecting ajury and conducting the penalty
trial. Such a defendant should further argue that she is prejudiced by
possibly having to share peremptory strikes with her co-defendant, and
depending on the facts, that it is prejudicial for a joined defendant, who
may not be subject to the death penalty, to nevertheless be tried before a
death-ualified jury.
8o Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 14.
84 "The court may order two or more indictments or informations
or both to be tried together.. ." Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 13.
85 See, e.g., United States v.Jamar, 561 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1991).
86 The U.S. District Court Rules for the Eastern District of Virginia
require written motions in all civil cases, however. (Rule 11).
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which the defendant has commissioned within ten days before trial. 87 In
fact, the Virginia rules require all discovery motions to be made no later
than ten days before trial and all discovery requests must be included in
that motion. 88 The discovery request may only be amended for good
cause shown. By contrast, Federal Rule 16 does not impose definite time
limits, nor does it require defense counsel to consolidate all discovery
requests in a single motion.
The most important difference in discovery under the federal system
and the Virginia system involves discovery of certain scientific and
medical analyses. The federal rules require the U.S. Attorney to permit the
defendant to "inspect and copy or photograph any results or reports of
physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments, or
copies thereof, which are within the possession, custody, or control of
the government ..."89 Virginia rule 3A: 11 has a similar provision, but
recent statutory amendments have broadened the scope of defendant's
discovery rights in Virginia. Virginia Code section 2.1-434.11 authorizes
the defendant to receive results of any tests performed by the Division of
Forensic Science or the Division of Consolidated Laboratory Services
directly, rather than through the Commonwealth's Attorney. 90 Virginia
law seems to offer defense counsel more opportunity for complete
discovery than the federal rules.91
V. CHALLENGING THE UNASSAILABLE STATUTE
Chief Justice Rehnquist has been critical of the most recent Con-
gressional efforts to create new federal death penalty crimes. He believes
that by creating a host of new federal capital crimes, federal prosecutors
will be overburdened, and the federal government willbe encroaching on
an area best left to state prosecutors.92 However, if the Chief Justice
examined the history of the 1988 Federal Drug Kingpin statute, his fears
might be allayed a bit by the fact that the death penalty has been sought
in so few cases. 93 Perhaps Congress drafted the statute in such a way that
it assumed the penalty would be pursued in only the most egregious of
cases. If that is the case, then Congress purposely drafted a statute that
inspires extreme prosecutorial restraint. The more likely explanation,
however, is that although Congress would like to see more extensive
utilization of the statute, prosecutors are, initially at least, simply hesitant
to apply the law.
Like any prosecutor faced with the choice of pursuing a capital
charge, U.S. Attorneys will be faced with a decision as to whether they
can afford to devote the extraordinary resources necessary for a capital
trial. The statute provides many procedural safeguards which will make
imposition of the death penalty difficult. Moreover, because the death
penalty has not been applied on the federal level since 1963, the number
of prosecutors who have tried a capital case, and the members of the
federal bar with capital defense experience must be minuscule.
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Setting the motivations of the prosecutor aside, the statute has a
number of weaknesses. One immediate problem stemmed from the fact
87 Rules of Sup. Ct. of Va. 3A:11(c)(1).
88 Rules of Sup. Ct. of Va. 3A:1
89 Fed. R. Crim Pro. 16(1)(D) (emphasis added).
90 This statute also authorizes defense counsel to take advantage
of the resources of the Division of Forensic Science or the Division of
Consolidated Laboratory Services upon approval by the court. However,
if defense counsel wants an independent expert to perform tests, the
independent expert must supply his own facilities and equipment. See
Va. Code § 2.1-434.12 (1990).
91 The local rules of the U.S. District Courts for both the Eastern and
Western Districts of Virginia do not include provisions which elaborate on
criminal discovery as such, and therefore the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure would seem to be the primary guide fordiscovery methodology.
92 See Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 393,
407 (1992).
93 See Introduction supra.
94 The statute requires that appointed counsel in capital cases tried
that each state chooses its own method of execution and that fourteen
states do not have the death penalty. Therefore the possibility existed that
federal death sentences would be carried out in a non-uniform fashion.
This problem was alleviated by outgoing Attorney General Barr who
issued aJustice Department rule that lethal injection would be themethod
of execution for federal convicts.
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A substantive objection to the statute which remains concerns the
two-tiered system of aggravation. As described supra, in order for the
Government to prevail at the sentencing stage, it must show at least one
of the primary aggravating factors set out in 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(1), plus
one other aggravating factor. The first factor set out in subsection (n)(1)
is that the defendant "intentionally killed the victim." Since the very
purpose of the Federal Drug Kingpin statute is to punish intentional drug-
related killings, the scheme for aggravation has a built-in aggravating
factor. By the very nature of the predicate offense, any defendant found
guilty under §848(e) will be able to satisfy at least one of the aggravating
factors under subsection (n)(1).
The Court has held that just because an aggravating factor duplicates
an element of the offense, a death sentence need not be overturned.
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However, because of the structure of the scheme of aggravation within the
context of this statute, almost every conceivable killing will satisfy at least
one aggravating factor, and therefore there is a built-in advantage to the
prosecution at the sentencing stage, what one commentatorhas called "the
'stacking the deck' effect of the multiple duplicative aggravating fac-
tors." 97 Despite the clearprejudice in the scheme, the drafters of the statute
may have defeated any challenges to that aspect of the scheme of
aggravation by requiring that in addition to the primary aggravators
included in subsection (n)(1) that the Government also establish other
aggravating factors, i.e., the factors enumerated in subsections (n) (2)- (12)
or another aggravator of which defense counsel is given notice. The statute
also insulates itself from attack by explicitly stating in the statute and
requiring ajury instruction to the effect that "regardless of its findings with
respect to aggravating and mitigating factors, [the jury] is never required
to impose a death sentence ....,,98
Another weakness, mentioned above, is the use of the aggravating
factor describing the offense as committed in an "especially, heinous,
cruel, or depraved manner in that it involved torture or serious physical
abuse to the victim."99 Unlike Virginia, which relies on its constitution-
ally questionable "vileness" factor as one of two exclusive aggravating
factors, the "heinousness" factor in the factor is one of eleven secondary
statutory aggravators. However, because theprimary (n)(1) aggravating
factors are practically automatic under the federal sentencing scheme,
the "heinousness" factor in the federal scheme is as important as any
other aggravating circumstance, perhaps the most important. For ex-
ample, in the years since Furman v. Georgia was decided, Florida trial
courts have found a "heinousness" aggravating factor in approximately
four hundred ninety out of six hundred forty-one cases in one sample.t00
Although application of a "heinousness" aggravating factor can be void
under § 848, if appointed before judgment, have at least five years
experience before the federal bar with at least three years experience
trying felonies. If appointed afterjudgment, the attorney must have been
admitted to practice before the court of appeals for not less than five years
and have had not less than three years experience handling appeals in
felony cases before that court. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(5),(6).
5 Ronald J. Ostrow, U.S. Issues Rule to Return Death Penalty,
L.A. Times, Dec. 1, 1992, at A19.
96 See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988), and case
summary of Lowenfield, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 10
(1988).
97 Tombolowsky, Drugs and Death, supra note 11, at 62.
98 21 U.S.C. § 848(k).
99 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(12).
100 See Mello and Medlin, Espinosa v. Florida: Constitutional
Hurricane, LambentBreeze, orIdiot Wind?, 22 Stetson L. Rev. 909,921
(1993).
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for vagueness under Godfrey v. Georgia,101 it must be noted that the
federal statute narrows the heinousness aggravator to cases involving
torture or serious physical abuse.
Identification of potentially successful challenges to the statute will
depend how the statute is applied. If the Government continues to seek
the federal death penalty in only the most outrageous cases, and pros-
ecutes the true drug kingpins, then the Congressional intent will be
satisfied. But if the Government uses the Federal Drug Kingpin statute
in such a way that even the most attenuated drug-related killing leads to
a death sentence for a common addict or street dealer, then the statute
should be challenged for being overly broad. Even if a constitutional
challenge fails, defendants may benefit in the event of an overly broad
application of the Federal Drug Kingpin statute, because trial courts may
give some favorable treatment to defendants if they sense the Govern-
ment is abusing the statute and straying from the original intent of the
drafters of the legislation.
The concept of a federal death penalty in a nation where a significant
number of states have chosen to outlaw capital punishment strikes at the
heart of federalism. "Evolving standards of decency" 102 will develop
one state at a time. A federal death penalty will retard the evolution away
from capital punishment, if that is indeed the way this society is
moving. 103 Perhaps if the federal government chose to preempt state law
and perform all executions, a federal death penalty would not offend
federalism. However, the police power, the power to protect the health
and safety of its citizens is central to sovereignty of every state, and
therefore the federal government will not exclusively occupy the field in
this area.
As a result, we have the anomalous outcome of the possibility of
executions in states where the death penalty is otherwise illegal. This has
more than philosophical import. In the highly specialized field of capital
defense, it will be extremely difficult to find qualified defense counsel in
states which have no experience with the death penalty.
VI. THE MORAL OF THE STORY
The purpose of this article was twofold. First of all, it was intended
to introduce Virginia practitioners to the federal death penalty statute.
Secondly, the article attempted to compare and contrast the federal
scheme with the Virginia scheme for the particular benefit of attorneys
familiar with Virginia capital procedures. In order to conclude this
article properly, it is best first to examine the latter aim, and try to decide
under which scheme a defendant's rights are better protected.
The rules of criminal procedure in Virginia are based on the federal
rules, and as we have seen, there are few significant differences. The new
Virginia statutes expanding a defendant's rights to discovery of scientific
evidence104 might have some impact in a particular case, however. The
generous number of peremptory strikes (twenty) under the federal
system might generally help defendants, but the inability to question
jurors directly (in some cases) may outweigh any potential benefits.
It is equally difficult to draw broad conclusions about the implica-
tions of the differences in procedure at the sentencing stage. Virginia's
101 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
10 2 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
103 In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 294-95 (1976)
(plurality opinion), Justice Stewart stressed the important role state
legislatures play in shaping "contemporary standards of decency." A
federal death penalty distorts the evolution away from the death penalty
which may be developing at the local level. A recent poll by the Death
Penalty Information Center indicates that forty-four percent of Ameri-
cans prefer life without parole (when combined with restitution) as a
penalty in murder cases, while 41% would still support the death penalty.
While such statistics may be inconclusive as to identifying a trend, they
do indicate people's openness to alternative punishments. For similar
Virginia statistics, see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
failure to give juries any guidance in how to consider mitigating evidence
may work for or against defendants. A Virginia defendant may put
mitigating evidence before a jury that a federal jury guided by a
"preponderance of the evidence" burden of proof might be barred from
considering.
Finally, regarding the elaborate federal system for considering
aggravating and mitigating factors, the context within which these
prosecutions proceed must be taken into account. To date, U.S. attorneys
have been very hesitant to seek the death penalty under the Federal Drug
Kingpin statute. If federal prosecutors continue to be cautious, it is likely
that the death penalty will only be sought in the most egregious of cases
within the context of a drug conspiracy. As a result, because the class of
defendants being charged underthe two statutes are so different, compar-
ing schemes of aggravation and mitigation in the abstract seems to be a
less than worthwhile exercise.
Amidst this cloud of ambiguity, perhaps there are two things that
can definitely be said. First of all, defendants under the age of eighteen,
certain mentally ill defendants, and the retarded will fare better under the
federal scheme, as they are categorically barred from the death penalty.
Secondly, the quality of the legal representation which defendants
receive under the federal system is unlikely to be better or worse than a
defendant would receive under the state system, because the men and
women acting as defense counsel under the two systems are likely to be
the same people. As mentioned above, the federal bench will only have
one place to look in the 1990's for experienced capital defense counsel,
and that is in the state systems.
That conclusion brings us back to the first aim of the article, that is,
to educate Virginia defense counsel about the federal death penalty.
Despite the use of the term above, there is no such thing as a typical
capital defendant and whether her rights are protected in any particular
case depends primarily on her defense counsel's competent advocacy.
Those who will be charged with defending federal defendants should
become familiar with the nuances of federal procedure, because depend-
ing on the political climate,t 05 the federal death penalty could begin to
be utilized more widely.
The burden on defense counsel defending a federal capital defen-
dant will be particularly great. Because U.S. Attorneys have been highly
selective about which defendants they will try under 21 U.S.C. § 848,
defense counsel ina federal case maybe faced with an even more difficult
task than defending the typical capital defendant. While a "typical"
Virginia capital defendant may have murdered a relative or killed
someone during a robbery, it is more likely that a federal defendant has
committed a murder within the context of a major drug conspiracy
(qualifying as a Continuing Criminal Enterprise) or has killed a law
enforcement officer. However, while the facts in the typical federal case
will make it a more difficult case to defend than the typical Virginia case,
ultimately the demands on the lawyer will be the same. As with any
capital case, all defense counsel can do, and what she must do, is to be
thoroughly prepared through all stages of the litigation, and to zealously
and diligently represent the defendant.
104 Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-434.11, 2.1-434.12 (1990).
105 When gauging the current political climate it should be noted
that in the original version of the crime bill currently pending before
Congress, one of the proposals was to create a new death penalty crime
for convicted drug kingpins even when prosecutors had no proof that
the individual caused a killing. At the urging of Attorney General
Reno, the provision has been removed from the bill. See, Michael Isikoff,
Death Penalty for Drug "Kingpins" Dropped from Crime Bill, Wash.
Post, Sept. 23, 1993, atA15. However, the "Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1993," H.R. 3131, currently pending before
Congress, still contains approximately fifty new death penalty crimes.
